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Asarco LLC v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 866 F.3d 1108 (9th Cir. 2017) 
 
Ryan L. Hickey 
 
The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, 
and Liabiltiy Act, commonly known as CERCLA, facilitates cleanup of 
hazardous waste sites and those contaminated by other harmful substances 
by empowering the Environmental Protection Agency to identify 
responsible parties and require them to undertake or fund remediation. 
Because pollution sometimes occurrs over long periods of time by 
multiple parties, CERCLA also enables polluters to seek financial 
contribution from other contaminators of a particular site. The Ninth 
Circuit clarified the particuar circumstances under which contribution 
actions may arise in Asarco LLC v. Atlantic Richfield Co., holding non-
CERCLA settlements may give rise to CERCLA contribution actions, and 
corrective measures imposed under different environmental statutes may 
qualify as response actions required for a responsible party to seek 
contribution from another. In addition, the court clarified what constitutes 
resolved liability in such situations, another prerequisite for contribution 
actions. That final determination led it to vacate a district court’s grant of 
summary judgment in favor of Atlantic Richfield based on an erroneous 
conclusion that Asarco, in seeking financial contribution from Atlantic 
Fichfield for remediating a CERCLA site both had contaminated, 
exceeded the applicable statute of limitations. The case was thus remanded 




 In August 2017, a three-judge panel of the Ninth Circuit Court of 
Appeals issued a decision clarifying how non-governmental entities may 
seek contribution from other potentially responsible parties (“PRPs”) in 
the cleanup and remediation of contaminated sites under the 
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability 
Act (“CERCLA”).1 In that decision, the panel made it easier for parties 
responsible for contaminating a CERCLA site to hold other polluters of 
that same site accountable via monetary contributions.2 Three major 
companies were relevant to this litigation: the Anaconda [Copper] Mining 
Company, the Atlantic Richfield Company (“Atlantic Richfield” or 
“Arco”), and the American Smelting and Refining Company (“Asarco”). 
Because Atlantic Richfield purchased Anaconda in 1977, thereby not only 
acquiring the company but also its existing and future environmental 
liabilities under CERCLA, only Atlantic Richfield and Asarco are named 
in this litigation.3  
                                                 
1. Asarco LLC v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 866 F.3d 1108 (9th Cir. 
2017). 
2. Id. at 1129. 
3. Id. at 1114-15. 
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II. FACTUAL & PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
 
 This case focuses on two facilities in and around East Helena, 
Montana: a lead smelter operated by Asarco for more than a century, and 
a zinc fuming plant operated by Anaconda from 1927 to 1972, and 
subsequently by Asarco from 1972 to at least 1982.4 Both facilities harmed 
the surrounding environment throughout their lifespans by emitting lead, 
arsenic, and other toxic compounds and heavy metals into the air, water, 
and soil.5 
 Considering the environmental damage, both facilities, along with 
the City of East Helena, were designated as the East Helena Superfund 
Site (the “Site”) and added to the CERCLA National Priorities List in 
1984.6 Later that decade, the Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) 
deemed both Asarco and Anaconda PRPs for the Site’s contamination, but 
only pursued financial contributions from Asarco; consequently, by 1998 
Asarco had agreed to pay for portions of Site cleanup in three separate 
CERCLA settlements with the United States.7 
 Beyond CERCLA, the government also targeted Asarco for 
polluting the Site by pursuing civil penalties and injunctive relief under 
the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (“RCRA”) and Clean Water 
Act (“CWA”), all of which Asarco ultimately settled.8 Given the U.S. 
government’s pursuit of a RCRA “corrective action,” the settlement, 
known as the 1998 RCRA Decreee, not only charged Asarco fines, but 
also required that Asarco “remediate, control, prevent, or mitigate the 
release, potential release or movement of hazardous waste or hazardous 
constituents into the environment or within or from one media to another,” 
which the Decree defined as “Corrective Measures.”9  
 Asarco was unable to meet those obligations and, in 2005, filed 
for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection.10 In 2009, the bankruptcy court’s 
efforts yielded yet another consent decree among the United States, the 
State of Montana, and Asarco: the “CERCLA Decree.”11 Of that decree’s 
many provisions, most notable to these proceedings was one that saw 
Asarco pay nearly $100 million to “fully resolve[] and satisf[y]” its 
remaining obligations under the 1998 RCRA Decree.12 
 The case from which this appeal arose began when Asarco 
initiated a CERCLA contribution action against Atlantic Richfield in June 
2012, through which it sought to offset some of its financial burden under 
the CERCLA Decree.13 Because Anaconda had previously been 
                                                 




8. Id.  
9. Id. 
10. Id. at 1114-15. 
11. Id. at 1115. 
12. Id.  
13. Id. 
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designated a PRP for the Site, and Atlantic Richfield had taken on 
Anaconda’s liabilities when it bought Anaconda, Asarco pursued financial 
contribution from Atlantic Richfield under the following section of 
CERCLA: 
(B) A person who has resolved its liability to the United 
States or a State for some or all of a response action or for 
some or all of the costs of such action in an administrative 
or judicially approved settlement may seek contribution 
from any person who is not party to a settlement . . .14 
The phrase, “a person who is not party to a settlement” means any entity 
that has not yet “resolved its liablity to the United States or a State in an 
administrative or judicially approved settlement.”15 Asarco wanted 
Atlantic Richfield to help fund cleanup because it met that description. 
 Atlantic Richfield fought Asarco’s actions, primarily by alleging 
the relevant statute of limitations had passed; they believed the three-year 
timer started ticking when Asarco entered the RCRA Decree in 1998, not 
the CERCLA Decree in 2009.16 Asarco responded with two arguments: 1) 
RCRA and CERCLA are separate statutes, so RCRA actions cannot start 
the CERCLA statute of limitations clock, and 2) the CERCLA Decree 
created new obligations for Asarco different from those in the RCRA 
Decree, requiring a new statute of limitations regardless.17 In the United 
States District Court for the District of Montana, Judge Dana Christensen 
determined the statute of limitations had run and granted Atlantic 




 The Ninth Circuit panel explained its approach to this case in a 
section entitled “Statutory Context.”19 There, the opinion addressed the 
history and legislative intent of CERCLA, relevant results of the 
“Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986,” term-of-art 
definitions, and statutory interpretation, among other topics.20 Then, 
reviewing the district court’s decision de novo, the panel divided its 
discussion into four sections: three regarding whether Asarco could have 
brought a contribution action against Atlantic Richfield  based solely on 
the 1998 RCRA Decree, and one evaluating Asarco’s resolution of liability 
under the CERCLA Decree.21 
 The court began by addressing whether a CERCLA contribution 
action may arise out of a non-CERCLA settlement agreement because 
                                                 
14. 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(3)(B) (2018).  
15. Id. at § 9613(f)(2). 
16. Asarco, 866 F.3d at 1115. 
17. Id. 
18. Asarco LLC v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 73 F.Supp.3d 1285 (D. Mont. 
Aug. 26, 2014). 
19. Asarco, 866 F.3d at 1115. 
20. Id. at 1115-17.  
21. Id. at 1118-29. 
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Atlantic Richfield alleged that Asarco’s window for seeking a CERCLA 
contribution action began after the 1998 RCRA settlement, not the 2009 
CERCLA one.22 The opinion provided three reasons why a non-CERCLA 
settlement may give rise to a CERCLA contribution action.  
First, the court noted that §113(f)(1) of CERCLA expressly 
provides that contribution actions in those circumstances are only proper 
after a CERCLA settlement, whereas the section in question––
113(f)(3)(B)––lacks any similarly restrictive language.23 Per the statutory 
construction principle that word choice is deliberate and meaningful, the 
court took this to support allowing non-CERCLA settlements to initiate 
CERCLA contribution actions.24 Second, the court pointed to CERCLA’s 
broad purpose, stating, “An interpretation that limits the contribution right 
under § 113(f)(3)(B) to CERCLA settlements would undercut private 
parties’ incentive to settle . . . thereby thrwarting Congress’ objective and 
doing so without reaping any perceptible benefits.”25 Finally, the court 
determined this statutory interpreatiation matches the EPA’s 
administrative one, which in its opinion “merits some deference.”26  
After discussing the circuit split over CERCLA/non-CERCLA 
settlements and contribution actions27, the opinion evaluated whether the 
1998 RCRA Decree met the second prerequisite to a contribution action: 
requiring response actions or costs from Asarco.28 This court answered 
that in the affirmative.29 Beyond fines and mandates, the court noted, “The 
agreement’s requirement that Asarco take various ‘corrective measures’ is 
particularly noteworthy because RCRA expressly defines ‘corrective 
action’ as a type of ‘response’ action.”30 Thus, it held the 1998 RCRA 
Decree included response actions for  CERCLA contribution purposes.31 
Taking up the third 1998 RCRA Decree issue––resolution of 
liability via that settlement––the court agreed with Asarco that the 
company had not thereunder “resolved its liability to the United States or 
[State of Montana] for some or all of [its response action] or the costs of 
such action.”32 This point governed the statute of limitations issue; if 
Asarco had resolved its liability via the 1998 RCRA Decree and the 
company’s subsequent response actions or expenditures, it would have 
met all three prerequisites to bring CERCLA contribution actions against 
other potential or known PRPs at that point.33 In that case, because of the 
                                                 
22. Id. at 1118. 
23. Id. at 1118-19. 
24. Id. 
25. Id. at 1119. 
26. Id. 
27. Asarco, 866 F.3d at 119-121. 
28. Id. at 1121. 
29. Id.  
30. Id. (emphasis in original).  
31. Id. 
32. 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(3)(B) (2018). 
33. Asarco, 866 F.3d at 1121.  
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three-year statute of limitations for contribution actions, Asarco’s chance 
to seek financial help from other PRPs would have expired in 2001.34 
Analyzing this issue, the court first rejected Atlantic Richfield’s 
argument that Asarco had waived this point by not raising it during lower 
court proceedings.35 While true, the judges noted that waiver “is not an 
absolute bar to our consideration of arguments on appeal.”36 Given the 
desire to avoid miscarriage of justice, need to maintain confidence in 
judicial processes, and exclusively legal nature of this appeal, the court 
forgave Asarco’s oversight and  took up the issue’s merits.37 
Once again, the court began with statutory language, particularly 
precedent that “the nature, extent, or amount of a PRP’s liability must be 
decided, determined, or settled, at least in part, by way of agreement with 
the EPA” before that liability can be considered resolved for purposes of 
contribution actions.38 The court then delved into Sixth and Seventh 
Circuit precedent, seeking to stake out its own circuit’s position.39 
Ultimately the panel fell “somewhwere in the middle of these various 
cases,” 40 deciding “[s]ettlement agreement[s] must determine a PRP’s 
compliance obligations with certainty and finality,” the government may 
retain its ability to enforce agreements, agreements may be considered 
“resolved” even if conditioned on completed performance that is not yet 
completed, and a PRP’s refusal to concede liability in an agreement does 
not impact the resolution status of that agreement.41 
With their definition established, the court applied it to the 1998 
RCRA Decree, deciding it failed to resolve Asarco’s liability at the Site.42  
Because the Decree did not settle definitively any of 
Asarco’s response obligations it did not “resolve[] 
[Asarco’s] liability.” Accordingly, Asarco could not have 
brought a contribution action pursuant to the 1998 RCRA 
Decree and the corresponding limitations period did not 
run with that agreement.43 
The court then turned to the final issue: whether the 2009 CERCLA 
Decree succeeded where the 1998 RCRA Decree had not, thereby 
resolving Asarco’s Site liability. 
 Reiterating the factors necessary for a timely contribution claim, 
this panel determined the lower court erred in holding Asarco had not 
satisfied those when making its contribution claim against Atlantic 
                                                 
34. 42 U.S.C. § 9613(g)(3) (2018). 
35. Asarco, 866 F.3d at 1122. 
36. Id. (citing In re Mercuruy Interative Corp. Sec. Litig., 618 F.3d 988, 
992 (9th Cir. 2010)). 
37. Asarco, 866 F.3d at 1122. 
38. Id. (quoting Bernstein v. Bankert, 733 F.3d 190, 212 (7th Cir. 2013) 
(emphasis in original)). 
39. Asarco, 866 F.3d at 1122-24. 
40. Id. at 1124. 
41. Id. 
42. Id. at 1125-26. 
43. Id. at 1126. 
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Richfield under the 2009 CERCLA Decree.44 With that established as the 
point when Asarco resolved its Site liability, the court held Asarco’s 
seeking of contribution from Atlantic Richfield in June 2012 timely.45 As 
for the other two criteria, the court noted the roughly $100 million Asarco 
was required to pay into a trust for Site cleanup as evidence the CERCLA 
Decree covered response actions or, at absolute least, response costs.46 
Finally, the court held the CERCLA Decree also resolved Asarco’s 
liability at the Site by meeting the reqirements they laid out in the 
preceding section.47 
Having rejected all of Atlantic Richfield’s arguments seeking to 
undermine or discredit Asarco’s contribution claim against them for the 
Site, the panel took up one last point: Atlantic Richfield’s contention that 
deciding in favor of Asarco would be unfair.48 The opinion responded: 
Whether a right of contribution is available does not 
depend on whose ox gets gored: the fact that Asarco and 
not some other party was liable under the RCRA Decree 
does not change the fact that that agreement did not give 
rise to a right of contribution, whereas the CERCLA 
Decree did.49  
Despite alleging Asarco was ducking justice, Atlantic Richfield did not 




 Because the district court had granted Atlantic Richfield summary 
judgment in the earlier phase of this case, this Ninth Circuit opinion could 
only vacate the grant of summary judgment and remand the case for 
further proceedings, though it also specifically direted the lower court to 
adhere to the law as it had been clarified.50 Overall, this holding served to 
clarify a confusing part of CERCLA, establish precedent throughout the 
Ninth Circuit on issues of first impression there that have caused 
disagreement among other Circuits, and emphasize one particular set of 
circumstances in which PRPs may seek contribution from other PRPs for 
costs related to remediating contaminated areas.  
                                                 
44. Id. at 1127. 
45. Id. 
46. Id. at 1127-28. 
47. Id. at 1128. 
48. Id. at 1129. 
49. Id.  
50. Id. 
